PASSWORDS AND SIGN-IN METHODS

# Contoso Legal LLP

Harbour IT

| PREPARED BY | DATE | DATA COLLECTED | MICROSOFT 365 TENANT |
|---|---|---|---|
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How people sign in and how strong that is: methods by strength, admins without phishing-resistant MFA, the methods policy, and password age and expiry.

**Filtered view.** Methods registered: 1 of 6 rows, Method is Security key or passkey (FIDO2). Password age: 2 of 20 rows, Password last changed: in the last 30 days. The headline figures cover every row.

Phishing-resistant
**5 of 20**
Passkey, security key, Windows Hello or certificate

Admins without phishing-resistant
**1**
Admin roles should need a passkey or security key

Phone is the only second factor
**3**
Text message or voice call

Passwordless ready
**1 of 20**
Can sign in without a password

No self-service reset
**0**
Can't reset a forgotten password themselves

Password never expires
**20**
Fine with MFA: expiry is no longer advised

Password over a year old
**4**
Matters most without MFA

Never signed in, old password
**1**
Probably still the first password

## Strongest method 4 2 to review

Each enabled member counted once, by the strongest method they have.

### By strength




| Flag | Strength | People | Admins | Share of members | What it means |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Phishing-resistant | 5 | 1 | 25% | Bound to the real Microsoft sign-in page, so a fake page can't relay it. |
| | Authenticator app or token | 9 | 1 | 45% | Strong, but a convincing fake sign-in page can relay a code or push approval. |
| Medium | Phone (SMS or voice call) | 3 | 0 | 15% | Weakest second factor: texts and calls can be intercepted or moved to another SIM. |
| Medium | None | 3 | 0 | 15% | No second factor: the password alone gets in. |

## Methods registered 1

How many enabled members have each method. People usually have more than one.

### By method




| Method | Strength | People | Admins |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security key or passkey (FIDO2) | Phishing-resistant | 1 | 1 |

## Sign-in methods by person 20 7 to review

Enabled members and what they can sign in with, weakest first and admins at the top. Who hasn't set up MFA at all, and whether it's required, is in MFA coverage.

| Flag | Account | Admin | Admin roles | Strongest method | Methods | Asked for first | Passwordless | Self-service reset | What to do |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | annabel.fraser@contoso.example | Yes | Global Administrator, Groups Administrator (limited scope) | Authenticator app or token | Authenticator app | Authenticator app | No | Yes | Admin without a phishing-resistant method: register a passkey or security key. |
| | breakglass@contoso.example | Yes | Global Administrator | Phishing-resistant | Security key or passkey (FIDO2) | – | Yes | Yes | Nothing |
| Medium | joseph.morris@contoso.example | No | – | None | – | – | No | Unknown | No second factor. Set up MFA first (see MFA coverage). |
| Medium | lily.harrison@contoso.example | No | – | None | – | – | No | Unknown | No second factor. Set up MFA first (see MFA coverage). |
| Medium | reception@contoso.example | No | – | None | – | – | Unknown | Unknown | No second factor. Set up MFA first (see MFA coverage). |
| Medium | rhys.evans@contoso.example | No | – | Phone (SMS or voice call) | Mobile phone (SMS or call) | – | No | Unknown | Only a phone: set up the Authenticator app (or a passkey), then keep the phone as a backup at most. |
| Medium | sophie.taylor@contoso.example | No | – | Phone (SMS or voice call) | Mobile phone (SMS or call) | – | No | Unknown | Only a phone: set up the Authenticator app (or a passkey), then keep the phone as a backup at most. |
| Medium | william.allen@contoso.example | No | – | Phone (SMS or voice call) | Mobile phone (SMS or call) | – | No | Unknown | Only a phone: set up the Authenticator app (or a passkey), then keep the phone as a backup at most. |
| | evie.davis@contoso.example | No | – | Authenticator app or token | Authenticator app, Authenticator code (OATH) | – | No | Unknown | Nothing |

| Flag | Account | Admin | Admin roles | Strongest method | Methods | Asked for first | Passwordless | Self-service reset | What to do |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | jack.white@contoso.example | No | – | Authenticator app or token | Authenticator app, Authenticator code (OATH) | – | No | Unknown | Nothing |
| | megan.smith@contoso.example | No | – | Authenticator app or token | Authenticator app, Authenticator code (OATH) | – | No | Unknown | Nothing |
| | oliver.hill@contoso.example | No | – | Authenticator app or token | Authenticator app, Authenticator code (OATH) | – | No | Unknown | Nothing |
| | olivia.ward@contoso.example | No | – | Authenticator app or token | Authenticator app, Authenticator code (OATH) | – | No | Unknown | Nothing |
| | olivia.wilson@contoso.example | No | – | Authenticator app or token | Authenticator app, Authenticator code (OATH) | – | No | Unknown | Nothing |
| | owen.taylor@contoso.example | No | – | Authenticator app or token | Authenticator app, Authenticator code (OATH) | – | No | Unknown | Nothing |
| | william.clark@contoso.example | No | – | Authenticator app or token | Authenticator app, Authenticator code (OATH) | – | No | Unknown | Nothing |
| | ella.thomas@contoso.example | No | – | Phishing-resistant | Windows Hello for Business, Authenticator app | – | No | Unknown | Nothing |
| | jacob.johnson@contoso.example | No | – | Phishing-resistant | Passkey, Authenticator app | – | No | Unknown | Nothing |

| Flag | Account | Admin | Admin roles | Strongest method | Methods | Asked for first | Passwordless | Self-service reset | What to do |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | noah.clark@contoso.example | No | – | Phishing-resistant | Windows Hello for Business, Authenticator app | – | No | Unknown | Nothing |
| | priya.hughes@contoso.example | No | – | Phishing-resistant | Windows Hello for Business, Authenticator app | – | No | Unknown | Nothing |

## Sign-in methods policy 12

Which methods people may register and use, from the tenant's authentication methods policy, against what's recommended for a small business.

| Flag | Setting | Current | Recommended | Why |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Passkeys and security keys (FIDO2) | On for Break glass | On | Needed for phishing-resistant sign-in, which admins should use. |
| | Microsoft Authenticator | On for All users | On | The second factor most people should use. |
| | Authenticator shows which app is signing in | Microsoft managed | On (Microsoft managed turns it on) | Helps people spot a sign-in that isn't theirs. |
| ● Low | Authenticator shows where the sign-in is from | Off | On (Microsoft managed turns it on) | Helps people spot a sign-in that isn't theirs. |
| ● Low | Text message (SMS) | On for All users except Break glass | Off, once people use Authenticator | Texts can be intercepted or moved to another SIM. |
| | Voice call | Off | Off | Calls can be redirected, and are easy to approve by mistake. |
| | Email one-time passcode | On for All users | Off, unless guests or password reset need it | Not a second factor for members; only for password reset and guests. |
| | Temporary Access Pass | Off | On, for setting up passkeys | A time-limited pass for setting up a new phone or passkey. |
| | Registration campaign (asks people to set up Authenticator at sign-in) | Microsoft managed, for All users, can be skipped for 1 day | On, or Microsoft managed | Moves people off text messages and calls. |
| ● Low | System-preferred MFA (asks for the strongest method a person has) | Off | On, or Microsoft managed | Otherwise people are asked for their own default, often a text message. |

| Flag | Setting | Current | Recommended | Why |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | People can report an MFA prompt they didn't expect | Microsoft managed | On | A reported prompt blocks the account's risky sign-ins and alerts admins. |
| | Methods managed in this policy (not the old MFA and SSPR settings) | Yes | Yes | Microsoft has retired the old per-user MFA and SSPR method settings. |

## Authentication strengths in Conditional Access 0

Conditional Access policies that require a particular strength of MFA rather than any MFA. Requiring Phishing-resistant MFA for admin roles is the usual first step.

No Conditional Access policy requires an authentication strength. Start with one requiring Phishing-resistant MFA for admin roles, once admins have a passkey.

## Password age 2

When each enabled member's password was last set. An old password matters most without MFA; an account that has never signed in may still have the password it was created with. Problems first, then oldest first.

| Account | Password last changed | Never expires | Synced from on-premises | Last sign-in | MFA set up | What it means |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| william.allen@contoso.example | 15 Nov 2026 | Yes | No | 29 Nov 2026 | Yes | – |
| priya.hughes@contoso.example | 24 Nov 2026 | Yes | No | 29 Nov 2026 | Yes | – |

## Password expiry policy 3

How often cloud-only accounts on each domain must change their password. Microsoft and the NCSC now advise against regular expiry when everyone has MFA: forced changes lead to weaker, predictable passwords. Accounts synced from on-premises AD follow AD's policy instead.

| Flag | Domain | Signs in with | Passwords expire after | Reminder before expiry | Recommended |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | contoso.example | Microsoft Entra ID | Never | – | Never, with MFA required for everyone |

| Flag | Domain | Signs in with | Passwords expire after | Reminder before expiry | Recommended |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | contoso.onmicrosoft.com | Microsoft Entra ID | Never | – | Never, with MFA required for everyone |
| Low | parked.example | Microsoft Entra ID | 90 days | 14 days | Never, with MFA required for everyone |

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